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A Poetics of History:  
Karen Cushman's Medieval World  
 
Joseph Zornado  
 
There is no was.  
(William Faulkner)  
Historical fiction occupies an uncertain space in the field of children's literature. Offer a teacher 
or scholar a work of historical fiction in any genre, from picture book to novel, and you are sure 
to get a varied, contentious response about what makes historical fiction work. Why? Because 
historical fiction has ambitious, ambiguous aims. For instance, should historical fiction be good 
history, even if this means the story might be, say, a little dull? Or, on the other hand, should 
the author take liberties with setting, dialogue, and character in order to provide the audience 
with "a good read?" What happens when a historical fiction contains no "famous" historical 
personages, or no clear identification as to when in history the story takes place? In short, what 
are we supposed to experience when we read historical fiction? History? Fiction?  
Karen Cushman's Newbery Honor book Catherine, Called Birdy, and her Newbery Award-
winning The Midwife's Apprentice are no exceptions to this debate. Though honored by the 
Newbery award committee, Cushman's Catherine and Apprentice nevertheless draw mixed 
opinions about the books' merits as historical fiction from teachers and scholars alike. Those 
who favor the books praise the main characters, young women who discover within themselves 
the strength and confidence to survive, even thrive, in a brutal and unforgiving medieval world. 
Skeptics charge that Cushman's work is not "real" historical fiction, but rather, simply "fiction" 
because her work sacrifices historical "facts" in order to tell what amounts to contemporary 
stories about female adolescence. 
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 Alyce, the main character in Apprentice, does, says, and 
thinks in a way young women in the fourteenth century simply could not. In Cushman's first 
book set in medieval England, Catherine, the daughter of a knight--and by rights a "lady"--
develops a keen sense for the logical inconsistency that surrounds and makes up her life, and 
grounds her demands for fair treatment on this way of seeing the world. Some argue, then, that 
the history in these novels reflects more of Cushman's late twentieth-century concerns about 
women than it does historical truths of English medieval culture and countryside. And worse 
still, Cushman's work has been labeled by some as "politically correct."  
Yet, to my mind, those critical of Cushman's work rely on a too rigid sense of history and 
historiography. To dismiss Cushman on the grounds that her work violates traditional notions of 
historical fiction blinds us to Cushman's larger project: Catherine, Called Birdy and A Midwife's 
  
Apprentice challenge our notions of historical fiction, history, and how we make meaning of and 
from the past. Cushman's first two novels reveal a passion for the process of history-making 
rather than the product produced by the historian--which is why she populates her texts with 
marginalized, heretofore unexamined characters from medieval England. No kings or bishops 
take center stage in her first two novels. Rather, young girls with no power, no voice, and little 
or no future are her protagonists.  
Cushman sets out to challenge traditional notions of historical fiction by writing a new kind of 
historical fiction. Consider the literary notion of "setting." Setting represents one traditional 
element of historical fiction, and it remains an element that, among others, raises the hackles 
on some historians. "Setting must be integral to the plot, otherwise the tale is simply a 'costume 
romance' that exploits rather than explores history. . . . Whether a picture book, a book for 
beginning readers, or a novel, the historical story is composed of two elements. To be taken 
seriously, it must fulfill the requirements for both good history and good literature" (310). Yet, 
just what amounts to "good history" and "good literature" is not always so clear, and in fact is 
largely determined by the individual reader. The historian Allan Nevins commented on this 
problem of perspective when he wrote, "the facts of the past do not change, but our view of 
them does" and as a result, "each era tends--and perhaps needs--to reevaluate history in the 
light of its own experience" (Silvey 310).  
In Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Hayden White offers 
an analysis of just this kind of historiography. White draws on Northrop Frye's work to analyze 
the metahistorical process behind each and every attempt at history making. White writes, 
It is sometimes said that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by "finding," "identifying" 
or "uncovering" the "stories" that lie buried in chronicles; and that the difference between 
"history" and "fiction" resides in the fact that the historian "finds" his stories, whereas the fiction 
writer "invents" his. This conception of the historian's task, however, obscures the extent to 
which "invention" also plays a part in the historian's operations. (7)  
It is at the level of "metahistory" that the historian and fiction writer share the will to invent, to 
order, and to discriminate among the countless historical moments that each considers as 
resources for their work. White "postulates a deep level of consciousness on which a historical 
thinker chooses conceptual strategies by which to explain or represent . . . data. On this level," 
White writes, "the historian performs an essentially poetic act, in which he prefigures the 
historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories 
he will use to explain "what was really happening" in it. This act of prefiguration may, in turn, 
take a number of forms, the types of which may be characterized by the linguistic modes in 
which they are cast (x). And what was really happening in history is not so much a collection of 
facts, but rather, White suggests, it is the process of history making that is at the bottom of 
every written history. "The dominant tropological mode and its attendant linguistic protocol 
comprise the irreducibly 'metahistorical' basis of every historical work" (xi).  
White uses Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism and with it identifies the tropological modes 
from which historians and storytellers choose. The first set of four modes (out of three) consists 
of how historians plot their "historical moments." Following Frye, White calls these different 
modes the Romantic, the Tragic, the Comic, and the Satirical. White reduces it like this: if a 
historian has a Romantic vision, the king's death might represent the end of the story and the 
beginning of the prince's reign. Life goes on. Long live the King. If, however, a historian 
employs the Comic mode then the king's death--like a Shakespearean comedy--might mean 
the possibility of reconciliation and union for the individuals concerned. The prince marries the 
duchess, political stability is restored and a dynasty is born. On the other hand, if the historian 
employs the Tragic mode, then the king's death might be historicized in a way that it signifies 
the end of a golden period of peace and prosperity. White identifies the Satirical mode with 
Irony and self-criticism:  
Satire represents a different kind of qualification of the hopes, possibilities, and truths of human 
existence revealed in Romance, Comedy and Tragedy respectively. It views these hopes . . . 
Ironically . . . like philosophy itself, Satire "paints its gray on gray" in the awareness of its own 
inadequacy as an image of reality. It therefore prepares consciousness for its repudiation of all 
sophisticated conceptualizations of the world and anticipates a return To a mythic 
apprehension of the world and its processes. (10)  
White goes on to say that the historian then takes this plotted history and makes sense of it by 
placing it in a larger context, or what White calls "a nomological-deductive argument" (11). This 
argument--whichever one of four modes a historian chooses--contains within it universal laws 
of causal relationships. In short a nomological-deductive argument is nothing more than a kind 
of epistemology by which a historian makes sense of the stories of their culture. "What goes up 
must come down" is a kind of nomological-deductive argument that makes sense of the banal--
though plotted--story "the rock went up and suddenly stopped, and headed straight down." 
2
 
Whether meaning of this event is presented as a crisis or an opportunity depends on the 
historian, his or her mode of plotting, his or her epistemology and, finally, the ideology that, like 
salt, gives flavor to the whole mix.  
He calls this final, most important ingredient to the historian's project the "Mode of Ideological 
Implication." 
3
 What this means is this: when we examine the way in which a historian employs 
the Romantic mode, for instance, and then makes sense of the universe and its laws through a 
nomological-deductive argument, we can tease out the historian's Ideological leanings. "There 
does," White writes, "in fact, appear to be an irreducible ideological component in every 
historical account of reality" (21). In other words, the historian cannot help but leave 
"fingerprints" all over his or her work, which in turn reveal the ideological assumptions 
embedded in the history; it follows then that the histories that historians write also reveal in turn 
the modes of emplotment and modes of argument they have employed. The historian, then, is 
not unlike an artist who makes conscious--or unconscious--choices about his or her color 
palate and then paints a picture with those colors. The picture reveals the color palate and 
silently speaks of the artist's choices. Because of the colors the artist has originally chosen, he 
or she simply cannot successfully paint certain kinds of pictures and will be more inclined to 
paint others.  
I cite Hayden White's work on metahistory at length because it offers a particularly useful way 
of seeing Karen Cushman's medieval world and the kind of historical fiction she is writing, 
especially in the case of Catherine, Called Birdy. White describes the trope, "Irony" as a notion 
that grows directly out of the Satirical mode. He describes it in terms that are reminiscent of a 
"postmodern" analysis of language. White writes that  
Irony thus represents a stage of consciousness in which the problematical nature of language 
itself has become recognized. It points to the foolishness of all linguistic characterizations of 
reality as much as to the absurdity of the beliefs it parodies. . . . This is why characterizations 
of the world cast in the Ironic mode are often regarded as intrinsically sophisticated and 
realistic. They appear to signal the ascent of thought in a given area of inquiry to a level of self-
consciousness on which a genuinely "enlightened"--that is to say, self-critical--
conceptualization of the world and its processes become possible. . . . As a paradigm of the 
form a representation of the world process might take, it is inherently hostile to the "naive" 
formulations of the Formist, Mechanistic and Organicist strategies of explanation. And its 
fictional form, Satire, is intrinsically antagonistic to the archetypes of Romance, Comedy and 
Tragedy as modes of representing the forms of significant human development.  
In Catherine, Called Birdy Cushman moves the reader through a narrative that, among other 
things, plays out in fiction a number of the tropological modes White identifies in Metahistory. It 
is no accident, I think, that Cushman's protagonist, Catherine, discovers the limits of particular 
modes of thinking and abandons them only to settle on a kind of Satiric mode of self-reflection, 
adopting as she does an ironic turn of mind. Catherine discovers her ability to doubt even as 
she discovers the ability to trust her own instincts. As a result of this peeling-away of narrative 
modes, Catherine discovers her own capacity to suffer, and at the same time to doubt the 
cultural constructs that inflict that suffering; Catherine discovers the process of life, and as a 
result, she grows from seeing herself as someone else's property to seeing herself as self-
possessed.  
Yet, even Cushman herself seems a little uncomfortable with this idea. At the end of Catherine 
Cushman writes in an Author's Note, "our ideas of individual identity, individual 
accomplishments and rights, individual effort and success did not exist. . . . No one was 
separate and independent, [not] even the king" (165). Still, this begs the question, does the 
medieval life of the community necessarily exclude any hope of self-consciousness? Self-
consciousness is a large part of what makes humans human, even in the thirteenth century. 
And from self-consciousness comes the possibility of self-awareness and from self-awareness 
comes the possibility of doubt. And from doubt, or "aporia" as White terms it, grows that Ironic 
turn of mind known so well in the post-modern age, which "tends to dissolve all belief in the 
possibility of positive political actions" (White 38). But for Catherine (and Alyce in Apprentice) 
the possibility of personal action--however politicized and anachronistic it might appear to be to 
us--opens before her and she saves herself.  
This might sound as if I am suggesting that Cushman has written a radical, proto-feminist 
novel. When, in fact, Catherine's story could easily be read as a subversive tale bent on 
maintaining the oppressive status quo. 
4
 Again from White: he writes that "inasmuch as one 
can legitimately conclude from a history thus construed that one inhabits the best of possible 
historical worlds, or at least the best that one can "realistically" hope for, given the nature of the 
historical process as revealed in her account of it." One might conclude from all of this that 
Catherine--and women and children in general--already inhabit the best world that they can 
"realistically" hope for--they just need to learn how to make the best of it. Catherine's betrothal 
to Shaggy Beard, her escape from this betrothal because of his death and her subsequent 
marriage to Stephen, Shaggy Beard's fair-haired son might not be the stuff of medieval 
feminism, but rather, as sentimental propaganda: make the best of it and things will work out in 
the end. Which means that one might read Catherine in this way: paternalistic betrothals 
designed only for political and economic gain of the Father can work out in the end, if the 
daughter knows her place. 
5
  
Because Cushman is a fiction writer as well as a historian in this case, she has at her disposal 
all of the tools White describes in his Metahistory. As a result, Cushman does not confine her 
story to merely the Romantic/Comic modes of emplotment, but rather, she also employs the 
Satirical mode in her narrative and by doing so subverts a strictly conservative ideological 
reading. Cushman's manifestly Romantic/Comic plot is undercut by the content of Catherine's 
chronicle. This undercutting of conservative ideological implications works in two ways: first, 
Catherine's interest in the lives of the saints compels her to begin each day's journal entry with 
a small fact from a saint's life celebrated on that day. So, for instance, on the twelfth of July 
Catherine notes the "Feast of Saint Veronica, who wiped the face of the suffering Jesus with 
her veil, where His image remains to this day" is undercut by Catherine's mundane journal 
entry. "It is too hot to write. Too hot even for the cats to chase mice" (139). As Catherine's 
journal entries continue one is bombarded by an almost unending list of violence and cruelty in 
a majority of the lives of the saints that Catherine notes. As a result, the distance between the 
theological history of the church and Catherine's own experiences grows greater and greater 
until, finally, Catherine begins to question quietly the broader cultural history that shadows her 
own sense of time and place. Or, in other words, this is one of the ways Catherine learns to 
doubt, to look for multiple meanings, to find shades of gray rather than black and white.  
Second, Cushman's historical fiction employs--and perhaps even relies on--the reader's own 
doubt as a part of the reading experience. Much of Cushman's audience is well aware of the 
plight of women over the past seven hundred years. As late twentieth-century readers raised in 
an age of irony, skepticism, and resignation, we bring to the text the knowledge that for women 
and children--the marginalized--things have not improved very much at all for most of this past 
millennium. So that if Catherine were to transcend her historical moment somehow in her story, 
we know that it is only for one moment, and as such it remains anachronistic, conservative 
fantasy.  
Still, the self-conscious Satirical mode of Catherine, combined with the reader's own doubt 
about the "truth" of the history presented destroys any effort on the part of her audience "to use 
history as a means of comprehending the present world in anything but Conservative terms" 
(White 12). In other words, because the Satiric mode undermines the Comic and Romantic 
modes also employed in the novel, Catherine's story calls attention to itself as a necessarily 
provisional mode of truth-making; the provisional nature of the textual form unravels in a way 
that calls attention to the provisional nature of the content. Further, it is precisely because her 
audience questions the history of Cushman's fiction that we participate in a new kind of 
historical fiction. Simply put, we doubt that it is true. We ask of Cushman's medieval world 
questions like: could a young woman have been as brave, strong and true to herself as 
Catherine was in the thirteenth century? This must be an anachronism. Women did not have a 
sense of themselves as anything more than property for hundreds of years after that, right? 
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From this critical question some dubious conclusions have been drawn, among them the claim 
that the novel simply does not work as historical fiction because Catherine (or Alyce) could not 
have existed because Cushman's characters violate our notions of medieval England. This 
perspective reduces Cushman's two novels to political tracts and maintains notions of historical 
fiction as the domain of places and dates rather than the interpretive process it is.  
But what if I could invent a history where Catherine and Alyce did "exist"? How might that 
version of history shape the present moment? By refusing to consider the possibility of 
Catherine's existence we fall prey to another kind of conservatism, one which maintains today's 
status quo, for if we change our view of women in history, perhaps we will have to change our 
view of women (and children) right now. The writing of history and the reception of it share 
something in common: both are largely determined by what White calls "Ideological 
implications."  
I call Cushman's work historical fiction precisely because she calls attention to the provisional, 
slippery nature of storytelling, the writing of history, and the nature of the self. Catherine 
develops a sense of self--something that is, according even to Cushman, beyond the medieval 
mind set. Nevertheless, Catherine's growth and development falls along poetic--rather than 
scientific or historic--lines. Catherine's growth comes as a result of her brother Edward's 
encouragement to keep a journal. She does, and her writing grows stronger, and so too her 
vision. She becomes, by all rights, a writer, a poet and, finally, a character possessed of an 
"ironic" mindset.  
For instance, late in the novel Catherine takes tentative steps in distinguishing ideological 
traces in the lives of the saints from the so-called "facts" in religious history--itself a small step 
to philosophical and religious skepticism. Catherine notices "how many male saints were 
bishops, popes, missionaries, great scholars, and teachers while female saints get to be saints 
as a result of giving birth to a male saint, or refusing to marry some powerful pagan. It is plain 
that men are in charge of making saints (142; italics mine).  
Though this remains only a short entry in Catherine's chronicle, it speaks loudly to her skeptical 
point of view. What this entry of July twenty-sixth does not say speaks even louder: there is no 
mention of God, divine forces, the infallibility of popes or any other theological construct, 
though in past entries she has shown the intelligence to tackle theological issues in her own 
way. No, by July twenty-sixth Catherine recognizes however implicitly that culture--be it secular 
or religious--is created by men for men.  
Even in her role as Lady and as caregiver she finally abandons much of the superstition and 
ignorance of medieval medicine and resorts to what feels right: when her mother's legs have 
swelled late in her pregnancy, Catherine first tries "a paste of bean meal, flour, vinegar, and oil, 
but the dogs kept trying to eat it. So I washed her off and have been rubbing her legs with 
sweet-smelling oils and singing her sweet songs and it seems to help" (139).  
Later, in an entry from the twelfth of September Catherine reveals a decidedly ironic--even 
post-modern--notion of people. "I think sometimes," she writes, "that people are like onions. On 
the outside smooth and whole and simple but inside ring upon ring, complex and deep" (197). 
And like her entry about the creation of saints, what Catherine does not say implies the depth 
of her ironic turn of mind: onions have no inside, only ring upon ring of outside. Catherine's 
onion metaphor is a self-consuming one from which nothing is left when the last skin has been 
peeled. Catherine might also have written it this way: people (and the history they write) have 
no essence; we are only our clothes, our occupations, and the expectations the community and 
culture place on us. Perhaps this is a crisis or perhaps this is an opportunity.  
Because Cushman is not writing straight history or traditional historical fiction she has the 
freedom to draw on aspects of both genres and reject others. She employs multiple 
tropological modes as a historian and avoids "real" historical figures so that she might 
concentrate on the simple, plain, and powerless in her two novels. For some this is a problem 
in Cushman's work, but White's analysis of historiography reminds us that scientists and 
historians have never agreed on what makes history a good account of reality. White reminds 
us that, when debating the historiographical enterprise "it is important to bear in mind,"  
this congenital disagreement (or lack of agreement) over what counts as a specifically 
historical explanation of any given set of historical phenomena. For this means that historical 
explanations are bound to be based on different metahistorical presuppositions about the 
nature of the historical field, presuppositions that generate different conceptions of the kind of 
explanations that can be used in historiographical analysis. (13)  
A Midwife's Apprentice is another successful example of Cushman's challenging historical 
fiction precisely because it approaches the same kind of tension between fact and fiction, 
history and story that Catherine, Called Birdy explores. Some have criticized the novel as 
anachronistic because Cushman tells a tale of a young female orphan who, with luck and help, 
leaves the dung heap on the fringes of society and begins a process that, ultimately, leads her 
to a more secure, and most importantly, meaningful existence. What in this bare outline is 
anachronistic? Did young girls starve and sleep in dung heaps during the Middle Ages? If a 
second daughter was lucky enough to survive her initial birth during the Middle Ages, she very 
well may have been abandoned afterwards, and yet lived somehow. Did young girls desire a 
meaningful existence even though born and raised in a dung heap? Probably not, if only 
because they lacked the emotional and intellectual integrity to ask for more from life. Might it be 
possible to imagine a situation where a young girl does somehow manage to ask more of 
herself, her village, her life? Yes. Karen Cushman's novel is proof of this. What I am driving at 
is this: Historical fiction like Cushman's A Midwife's Apprentice does not examine a different 
medieval history, but rather, organizes the parts in a way that speaks to our concerns today. 
This is not anachronistic. This is simply the process of interpretive meaning-making at work.  
For instance, Alyce stumbles into a similar crisis of meaning when, in a scene reminiscent of 
Catherine's onion-skin metaphor about the nature of people, Alyce attempts to help an 
orphaned boy called "Runt." Alyce first encourages the boy to change his name, knowing from 
her own experience how humiliating and debilitating names can be. Runt and Alyce then 
discuss names and naming in some detail.  
"What then is the king's name?"  
Alyce did not know, so she hid the boy in the chicken house and went about the village asking 
folks what was the king's name.  
"Longshanks," said the baker.  
"Hammer," said Thomas At-the-Bridge.  
"The Devil Hisself," said Brian Tailor, who was a Scot and so had reason to feel that way.  
"Just 'the king' is all," said several.  
"Edward," said the bailiff. "The king's name is Edward."  
"Edward," said Alyce to the boy.  
"Then Edward is my name," said Edward, who used to be called Runt. Alyce nodded. (65)  
Two things strike me about this passage: first, as already noted, the power of names and the 
power of naming takes center stage. And second, Cushman suggests that those who live on 
the fringes of society see (and know) only what their position in life allows them to see. So few 
of the villagers know the king's "Christian" name, though they have their own name for him 
drawn from their own or their community's experience with him. So, the bailiff--a kind of 
medieval law enforcement officer--knows the King's name to be "Edward" because he draws 
his authority, ultimately, from him. On the other hand, the Scot knows the king as "The devil 
hisself." How we name others, it seems, speaks as much about who we are as how we name 
ourselves.  
By the time Alyce names Edward she has already gone through her own similar naming 
experience in which she chooses a new name, and in the process draws herself out of the 
dung heap and into the human community. With luck and a bit of mistaken identity, the young 
girl called "Dung" and "Beetle" names herself "Alyce" after being mistaken for a young woman 
of the same name, a young woman who reads. After this case of mistaken identity, "Beetle" 
wonders about it and realizes a truth about herself. "This face," she said, "could belong to 
someone who can read. And has curls. And could have a lover before nightfall. And this is me, 
Beetle." She stopped. Beetle was no name for a person, no name for someone who looked like 
she could read (31). As a result, Alyce christens herself anew--really for the first time--and here 
the pace of emotional growth gains momentum.  
Names, it seems, have everything to do with who we are, where we come from, the power to 
read the world and the power to read ourselves. When we name ourselves--with a first name, a 
title, a degree, or even as "father" or "mother"--we change our perspective on the world. We 
see more, we see differently, and we see with a purpose. Without a perspective from which to 
see, we see everything that is to say, we see nothing. The world is one flat blur. When we see 
from a particular perspective the world takes on perspective, too. Things lose their blur and 
come into focus a little more because, with a name--that is, with a perspective--we begin to 
develop a way to discriminate among images. We focus on things because, as we attempt to 
know ourselves we look for some reflection of that self in the world, at least at the beginnings 
of our emotional and intellectual development.  
From the moment Alyce names herself--like Catherine's growth as a writer discovering herself 
in the writing--in A Midwife's Apprentice. Alyce's growth as an emotional and intellectual 
woman takes off. Extending the power of naming, not unlike some latter-day Eve in the garden, 
she names her nameless cat "Purr." Rather than run or hide, she defends herself from the 
boys who torment her in the village. She takes some gentle revenge on the villagers who 
tormented the girl called "Dung" and "Beetle." And rather than merely serve Jane Sharp, the 
village midwife, she begins to pay attention to the art of midwifery, and her skills--and her 
confidence--as a midwife's apprentice begin to develop.  
Cushman's interest in the process and power of naming speaks to the power and process of 
historical fiction and it's cousin, history. What we see is, really, up to us and the sense we 
make of it depends on who we are, the information we have at our disposal and the values and 
cultural morays by which we determine which parts of that information are important and which 
parts might be disregarded. Historians and historical fiction writers work this problem out 
according to their own goals, but both share a similar desire to get to the truth about things. 
Both order their historical information in a way that best suits their ends. Does Cushman tell the 
"whole truth" about the relationship between the village and the manor, between the peasant 
and the lord? Probably not. Perhaps this might best be left to the historian. Nevertheless, 
Cushman persuasively draws a medieval world not so much to provide facts about medieval 
England, but rather, to help us remember the truth about who we were as people, and as a 
result, help remind us of who we are right now. Cushman's A Midwife's Apprentice remembers 
the past in order to help us recover the present.  
Alice Miller, a writer deeply concerned with children and their position in society, writes about 
repression and how we tend to recycle (to our detriment) what we forget. Miller's observations 
about memory and repression address a long overlooked question that Hayden White's work 
on metahistory implicitly asks but never answers: from where does one's ideological leanings 
come? According to Miller and her work on repression, creativity, and destructiveness one's 
ideological stance is a result of a complex array of influences, chief among them is a parental 
response to childhood trauma. When a parent invites and makes room for a child's emotional 
response--whatever the traumatic event--a child will not have to resort to repression, denial, or 
play-acting in an attempt to fulfill poisonous parental pedagogy. 
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 Unfortunately, as parents we 
were not always invited to experience our own emotional lives when we were children and as a 
result fail to observe the complex emotional lives of our own children. Further, because we 
remain locked in our own coping mechanisms learned in our own childhood, we pass these on 
to our children. This often takes the form of child abuse. Miller writes,  
Nature gives us only the ability to anesthetize ourselves when the mistreatment becomes 
unbearable. Our organism protects itself against the threat of death with the help of repression 
and denial. We forget the beatings and the disdain, or else we maintain that they did us some 
good--and go on to engage in the same practices with our children. The protective mechanism 
used by the child thus becomes fateful for the adult and for our species, for repression leads--
out of pure ignorance--to the destruction of our own children and our fellow human beings and 
to the acceptance of abuse as a normal way of life. (8-9)  
Miller's observations offer us a way to understand the individual as a process of recovering 
(remembering) one's own personal history, even if those memories take the form of forgotten 
emotions and later present themselves as conscious or unconscious ideological leanings.  
Literature offers a way to remember the past and live more passionately in the present. It helps 
us remember ourselves. Those in medicine and psychiatrics have concluded that, yes, the 
repression of memories does occur. In many cases repression is a type of psychic safeguard. 
It helps the abused and traumatized to stay alive in the midst of unspeakable cruelty and 
suffering. In other words, repression can be a good thing for a while. It acts as a defense 
mechanism in the face of suffering. We can shut it out, shut it off, and go on somehow. 
Nevertheless a lifestyle of repression, science also tells us, leads to unhealthy habits, even 
disease. We store memories in our bodies on a cellular level--and if the memories are 
traumatic enough they come out, some say, as a physical disease. These outbreaks of 
memory testify to the traumas we have repressed and that our bodies--when we break out in 
stress, illness, and disease, ask us to remember.  
Cushman marks Alyce's growth and development as a woman and as a human being not so 
much by the skills she learns as a midwife's apprentice or the babies she helps birth--though 
these are important details to consider--but rather, by her ability to feel her emotions. At the 
outset of the tale Alyce, known as Dung, is numb to the cold, to her hunger, and most of all to 
her emotions. As Alyce gains a measure of physical security in her life--i.e., food, shelter, and a 
kind of surrogate mother in the guise of Jane Sharp, the midwife--she begins to remember 
inchoate memories that mark her as human: she remembers how to make a song after helping 
Tansy the cow give birth to twins. Soon after, Alyce helps the Bailiff's wife give birth after the 
midwife had given the baby up for lost. So grateful are the Bailiff and his wife that they name 
their daughter Alyce Little. Never before has Alyce felt so complimented, appreciated, and 
respected by her community. That night, for the first time, she "lay down on her straw mat by 
the fire, and had a dream about her mother" (60).  
After a later, second attempt to act as mid-wife ends in failure,  
Alyce backed out of the cottage, then turned and ran up the path to the road, she didn't know 
why or where. Behind her in that cottage was disappointment and failure. The midwife had 
used no magic. She had delivered that baby with work and skill, not magic spells, and Alyce 
should have been able to do it but could not. She had failed. Strange sensations tickled her 
throat, but she did not cry, for she did not know how, and a heavy weight sat in her chest, but 
she did not moan or wail, for she had never learned to give voice to what was inside her. She 
knew only to run away. (70)  
Alyce finally gains enough experience and confidence that she can experience loss, shame, 
and disappointment. Nevertheless, though the sensations "tickled her throat" she cannot 
mourn nor give voice to her pain and so she runs away. Only after meeting the young boy, 
Edward, and finding him safe and happy does she discover how much she has missed him, 
her life in the village and her role as the midwife's apprentice. Yet before she can go back she 
must give voice to what is inside her. After Edward helps her identify and experience her 
maternal feelings, she finds a voice for the sadness and loss she experienced as a child.  
She would not be bringing Edward back with her to make her heart content, but she knew she 
had not failed him, and she breathed a heavy sigh of sadness, disappointment, and relief. It felt 
so good that she did it again and again until her sighs turned to sobs and she cried her first 
crying right there in the hen house . . ." (97)  
Soon after this she masters her fear and feelings of worthlessness and helps a woman birth a 
baby. From this experience Alyce recovers another part of her emotional life: she learns to feel 
joy in her own abilities, and pride in herself as a woman. "And then she laughed, a true laugh 
that came from deep in her gut, rushed out her mouth, and rang though the clear night air. And 
that was the true miracle that night, the first of June--the month . . . named for Juno, the 
Roman goddess of the moon, of women, and of childbirth" (111). Soon after Alyce discovers 
her desire to return to the village and take up again her role as midwife's apprentice.  
Catherine, Called Birdy and A Midwife's Apprentice represent stunning examples of historical 
fiction because history and the malleable--and contentious--process of history-making plays 
such a large role in the reader's experience of these texts. Cushman's Catherine, Called Birdy 
and A Midwife's Apprentice foreground Catherine's and Alyce's "becoming" and in the process, 
foreground the notion of history itself as one that is always becoming. From one perspective 
Cushman's historical fiction does not offer her audience historical figures from which we can 
draw a "true" experience of medieval England. We cannot. It is this among other things that 
separates her from the likes of Johnny Tremain. And yet, Cushman's handling of historical 
figures--and her view of women in thirteenth-century England--provokes a kind of crisis of 
knowing in the reader: what do we know of the past but the stories we tell of it? From this 
unmooring of our surety, and through the personally familiar yet historically overlooked 
Catherine and Alyce, we gain a broader understanding of our own society, and of our own 
sense of how we construct ideological notions of "woman," "child," and "self." Cushman 
teaches us, and we learn a little about how we too tell stories, sometimes whoppers, to justify 
our own ideological assumptions; she provides us with the opportunity to read her historical 
fiction the way her work reads us: as historians, as poets, as truth-makers.  
Joseph Zornado teaches children's literature, American literature, and writing at Rhode Island 
College.  
Notes  
1 When I write about skeptics and critical opinions of Cushman's work I am drawing on, among 
other things, conversations and discussions held on the Child.Lit Internet group.  
2 White identifies the four modes of argument as "Formist" Mechanistic Organicist and 
Contextualist. Marx represents the most famous Mechanistic historian. Organicist histories 
tend to provide a synthesis of data and point to "the telos toward which the whole process is 
tending over the long haul" (19). The Contextualist historian inclines "more toward synchronic 
representations of segments or sections of the process, cuts made across the grain of time as 
it were" (19). "The Formist theory of truth aims at the identification of the unique characteristics 
of objects inhabiting the historical field. Accordingly, the Formist considers an explanation to be 
complete when a given set of objects has been properly identified, its class, generic and 
specific attributes assigned, and labels attesting to its particularity attached to it" (14).  
3 The four modes of ideological implication according to White are the Anarchist, the Radical, 
the Conservative, and the Liberal. "Radicals and Anarchists believe in the necessity of 
structural transformations [in a society] the former in the interest of reconstituting society on 
new bases, the latter in the interest of abolishing "society" and substituting for it a "community" 
of individuals held together by a shared sense of their own common humanity" (24). 
Conservatives . . . are the most suspicious of programmatic transformations of the social status 
quo, while Liberals are inclined to view it through the analogy of [social] adjustments or "fine 
tunings," of a mechanism. In both of these ideologies the fundamental structure of society is 
conceived to be sound (24).  
4. Consider this: on the one hand, the affinities between Cushman's Romantic and Comic 
modes of plotting Catherine combined along with her Organicist mode of argument suggests a 
Conservative ideology latent in what otherwise might be construed as radical, proto-feminist 
texts. According to Hayden White, "The Romance is fundamentally a drama of self-
identification symbolized by the hero's transcendence of the world of experience, his victory 
over it, and his final liberation from it. . . . The archetypal theme of Satire is the precise 
opposite of this Romantic drama of redemption; it is, in fact, a drama of diremption, a drama 
dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its 
master, and by the recognition that, in the final analysis, human consciousness and will are 
always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the dark force of death, which is man's 
unremitting enemy (8-9). Comedy and Tragedy represent qualifications of the romantic 
apprehension of the world, considered as a process, in the interest of taking seriously the 
forces which oppose the effort at human redemption naively help up as a possibility for 
mankind in Romance. Comedy and Tragedy take conflict seriously, even if the former 
eventuates in a vision of the ultimate reconciliation of opposed forces and the latter in a 
revelation of the nature of the forces opposing man on the other. And it is possible for the 
Romantic writer to assimilate the truths of human existence revealed in Comedy and Tragedy 
respectively within the structure of the drama of redemption which he figures in his vision of the 
ultimate victory of man over the world of experience (10).  
5. From this conservative perspective one could read "the daughter's place" as a place from 
which she complains and resists for a time though ultimately yields to the overarching wishes 
of the father and his culture.  
6 This may be true, but this does not mean that a woman in the thirteenth century was 
congenitally unable to grow from this ideological belief. Consider Frederick Douglass, 
American abolitionist, former slave. He did the impossible by teaching himself to read--like 
Catherine in a way--and discovered his own humanity in the process though many along the 
way still viewed him as chattel.  
7 In The Untouched Key Miller offers a reading of Buster Keaton's childhood as an attempt to 
please parents and audience. Beginning as a three-year old in the twenties, Buster Keaton 
played on stage with his parents--and later made it into film. As a child, however, his role on 
stage was to take as much abuse as the performance required and never to respond 
emotionally; Keaton's role as a child, then, was to maintain a dead-pan face for which he was 
rewarded. The flatter the expression, the more the audience laughed. This might sound 
reasonable, yet apparently the physical abuse on stage could become so extreme that police 
and other authorities were routinely summoned to a show to make sure the child Keaton had 
not been damaged. More often than not the Keaton family moved on before the authorities 
arrived. In an interview late in life Keaton waxes poetic about his childhood, idealizing his 
parents, and revealing that he couldn't smile for years after, and in fact, he says, "I still can't." 
Keaton would have us believe that smiling is merely an act of muscles in the face and that he 
has mastered them--thanks to his parents. Miller suggests that, perhaps, smiling is a little more 
than a muscular activity.  
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